April 11,
2008
Real Estate Finance Committee
Federal Issues Committee
The following is for study only and has NOT been approved by the Real
Estate Finance Committee or the Board of Directors.
Issue:
C.A.R.
staff asked both the REF and FIC leadership to review the issue of allowing
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
(GSE) to purchase mortgage from lenders that are at risk of
defaulting. Staff requested this because Congress was preparing to
hear and vote on new legislation which C.A.R. did not have policy
addressing. REF and FIC leadership made the following recommendation
to the C.A.R. Leadership Team which they approved.
That
C.A.R. ?Support? allowing the government housing programs to purchase
mortgages from lenders that are at risk of defaulting. C.A.R.
believes that the government housing programs should not be utilized as a
taxpayer funded bailout; but, that lenders and homeowners should share in
the responsibility and cost.
Should C.A.R.
support proposed legislation that would allow and direct the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSE) to
purchase mortgages from lenders that are at risk of defaulting?
Background:
In early and mid 2007, the national housing market was showing signs of a
decline with a downturn in housing prices, a slowdown of sales, and an
increased rate of foreclosures. The market continued to worsen and
eventually led to the subprime market collapse. In August of 2007,
Wall Street responded by halting investments in not only subprime mortgage
backed securities (MBS) but all non government entity MBS. This
immediate drought of capital has contributed greatly to the current housing
market conditions that include, record-low home sales, record declines in
home prices and record numbers of foreclosures across the
country.
Besides the
current weak housing market, other factors are placing pressure on Congress
to take immediate action to stabilize the housing crisis and avert a
national recession. These include constituent complaints and cries
for help, lobbying efforts by Wall Street, lenders and other industry
parties, and 2008 being a presidential election year.
Summary:
While there are a number of proposals from Congressmen, Senators and
federal regulators, the two bills that have the best opportunity of passage
are those by Representative Barney Frank and Senator Christopher
Dodd. Frank and Dodd jointly announced their bills on March 13, and
while there are some differences the primary intention of both proposals is
to utilize the FHA to insure troubled mortgages and securitize them through
Ginnie Mae.
Frank
and Dodd Side-by-Side Comparison
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Concept
|
Frank
|
Dodd
|
|
Title (The bills are still in draft form and do not yet
have bill numbers)
|
FHA Housing Stabilization and Homeownership Retention
Act
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HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008
|
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Key Idea
|
Utilize FHA to insure up to $300 billion in troubled
mortgages that would be refinanced at a lower fixed-rate
loan and below the appraised value of the
property.
Would provide additional grant money for states to purchase
and rehabilitate homes.
|
Utilize FHA to insure up $400 billion in troubled mortgages
that would be refinanced at a lower fixed-rate loan and
below the appraised value of the
property.
Temporarily suspend GSE affordable housing goals and create
foreclosure prevention goals for them.
|
|
Eligibility
|
1. Owner occupied principal residence
2. Loan origination between Jan 1, 2005 and July 1,
2007
3. Debt-to-income (DTI) ratio greater than 40 percent as of
March 1, 2008
4. Borrower must certify they have not intentionally
defaulted on the existing loan
|
1. Owner occupied principal residence
2.
Can't afford current mortgage
payments (standards determined by the Board to be set up by
the legislation)
3.
Originated on or before Jan 1,
2008
|
|
Government Involvement
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FHA Insurance
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A new federal agency governed by a Board of department
heads and the chair of the FDIC which will oversee a
program utilizing FHA Insurance
|
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New Loan Amount
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The principal loan amount will be reduced to 90 percent of
the appraised value of the property. Additionally,
the single upfront FHA premium will be paid by further
reducing the loan value by an amount not to exceed 5
percent.
Annual premium is not to exceed 1.5 percent of the
remaining insured principal balance
|
The principal of the new loan will be the lesser of what
the borrower can afford to pay (set by the Board) or the
amount established at auction, and it may not exceed 90
percent of the appraised value of the property.
Additionally, the single upfront FHA premium will be paid
by further reducing the loan value by an amount not to
exceed 3 percent.
Annual premium is not to exceed 1 percent of the remaining
insured principal balance
|
|
New Loan Requirements
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1. Underwritten with full income
documentation
2. Must remain within current FHA loan limits at time of
underwriting
3. Fixed rate loan
4. Borrower can not be denied the loan based on FICO score
or default
|
1. Fixed rate loan
2. 30 year term
|
|
Net Equity Sharing
|
When the property is sold the borrower shall pay FHA the
greater of 3 percent of original insured principal
obligation of the mortgage
Or
A percentage of the portion of net
proceeds described below:
1. 100 percent during the first
year of the term of the
mortgage
2. 80 percent during the
second
year
3. 60 percent during the third
year
4. 40 percent during the
fourth
year
5. 20 percent during the fifth
year
6. 0 percent after the end of
the fifth
year
|
When the property is sold the borrower shall pay
FHA:
1.
90 percent of net proceeds if sold
between 1 year and 2 years
2. 80 percent if sold between 2 years and 3
years
3. 70 percent if sold between 3 years and 4
years
4. 60 percent if sold between 4 years and 5
years
5. 50 percent if sold after 5 years
This 50 percent would last in perpetuity until the borrower
sells the home.
|
|
Where Premiums will Go
|
Premiums will be placed in the Special Risk Insurance Fund
which is separate from the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund
(which finances most of its single-family mortgage
insurance) and the General Insurance Fund (which finances
most of its multifamily mortgage insurance). This allows
HUD to manage more effectively the greater risk supposed to
be inherent in these loans, thus lowering the insurance
premiums for the vast majority of
borrowers.
|
Premiums will be placed in a newly created HOPE
Fund.
|
|
Sunset Dates
|
Expires after a two-year period; however, the HUD Secretary
may extend the program up to four times for periods of no
longer than 6 months each.
|
The program will sunset on December 31,
2012.
|
|
Lender Requirements
|
This is a voluntary program. Lenders may choose to
auction loans they believe would qualify for the program
but will not be forced to.
|
This is a voluntary program. Lenders may choose to
auction loans they believe would qualify for the program
but will not be forced to.
|
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Miscellaneous
|
|
|
|
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Authorizes $10 billion in loans and grants for the purchase
and rehabilitation of vacant or foreclosed homes with the
goal of occupying them as soon as possible. Funds
distributed to states by the Secretary of the
Treasury.
|
HUD and OFHEO shall establish a foreclosure prevention goal
for Fannie and Freddie where they would purchase loans at a
discount and write down those mortgages. Mortgages
would be written down using the same criteria from FHA as
loans eligible for FHA insurance. OFHEO would be
given authority to require GSEs to raise capital
commensurate with additional risk this goal
poses.
Additionally, the GSE's low- and moderate-income housing
goals would be suspended.
|
(The
chart above is a compilation of information provided by the Mortgage
Bankers Association and C.A.R. staff summaries of the draft
bills.)
Pros and Cons
|
For
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Against
|
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Contrary to popular perception, these bills are not a
complete bailout. Lenders are forced to take a loss
on the loan through a cramdown of the principal below the
current appraised value. Homeowners will be forced to
pay mortgage insurance and forego a percentage of any
appreciation.
|
There is no overwhelming support for a bailout by
Americans. According to a December, 2007, CNN poll,
only 51 percent of Americans support using federal dollars
to help out struggling homeowners and only 25 percent
support bailing out lenders.
|
|
The current downturn in the housing market that has led to
skyrocketing foreclosure rates has had a devastating impact
on many communities across the county as well as in
California. These bills present an opportunity for
homeowners in trouble to possibly refinance into a safe and
affordable loan and stabilize the current
market.
|
Since the program would be voluntary for lenders, this is
nothing more than a statutory version of the failed Hope
Now program the administration flaunted as the savior of
the housing crisis. Lenders have shown little
interest in voluntarily participating in programs such as
this. With no real teeth these bills are little more
than a P.R. effort.
|
|
Many inside the beltway are in agreement that Frank and
Dodd will ?steamroll? these bills through their respective
chambers. That is not to say final passage of a bill
is a foregone conclusion as the bills differ in a number of
areas and these differences would have to be worked
out. However, at the core of both bills is utilizing
FHA to insure troubled mortgages.
|
What the market is currently experiencing is nothing more
than a correction of the skyrocketing home prices and home
sales from the previous five years. This is nothing
more than a healthy cycle in the real-estate market and the
only real cure is to let it work itself
out.
|
|
Premiums are deposited in funds separate from the FHA
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (MMIF) so it isn?t at
risk.
|
By forcing FHA to insure loans already in jeopardy of
defaulting Congress is essentially bailing out lenders and
homeowners using taxpayer money should the insurance
premium payments and principal reductions not be
sufficient.
|
|
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Is this fair? The majority of subprime loans are
fixed rate and are not in danger of foreclosure. Many
of these homeowners in fixed-rate subprime loans may have
been offered exotic adjustable-rate loans that would have
allowed them to purchase a more expensive home then they
actuality could have afforded. Instead these
homeowners took sensible loans with higher interest-rates
that they knew they could afford. Now irresponsible
homeowners who took out a loan they could not afford may
wind up with a lower interest rate and have their mortgage
principal reduced.
|
|
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While the Frank bill separates the program funds from the
MMIF, it does place them in the fund that is used to
support other programs and would place them in
jeopardy.
|
Outlook:
The House is very likely to pass Frank's bill. The House will
consider its inclusion into their Housing Stimulus Package it is addressing
the week of May 5.
When the
Senate proposed and passed its housing stimulus package, Dodd?s bill was
not included in it. While Dodd stated his intent to include his bill
in the housing stimulus package, Senator Shelby would not allow it.
NAR
Policy:
NAR is expected to address this at its May Business Meetings; however, they
did hold a series of conference calls and formed a policy position that
allowed them to comment favorably on the Frank bill in Committee
hearings